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NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR DEFENSE
ATTORNEYS: HOW RECORD
PRESERVATION REQUIREMENTS AFTER
THE NEW HABEAS BILL REQUIRE
EXTENSIVE AND EXCITING TRIAL
PREPARATION
ANDREA D. LYON*
INTRODUCTION
The writ of habeas corpus seems to most defense attorneys
some arcane thing that "federal" attorneys do to fix an error at the
state court level which resulted in the imprisonment or death sen-
tence for their client. The writ seems far removed and relatively
unimportant in the preparation of a case for trial. Trial lawyers,
particularly defense attorneys, certainly understand how impor-
tant it is to preserve the record, to object, and to state both the
federal and state grounds for the objection. However, it is not im-
mediately apparent how, working backwards, the Anti-Terrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996' (hereinafter "the new
Act" or "AEDPA") has changed, altered and intensified not only the
need to preserve the record, but also the manner in which such
preservation must be done. In fact, the new Act can be seen as
providing the support and justification for an expanded motions
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1. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub.
L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (to be codified in scattered sections of 28
U.S.C.).
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practice, evidentiary hearings and discovery.
Defense attorneys may see this new Act as just one more
overwhelming aspect of defending criminal cases. In many ways,
attorneys are not wrong to see it that way. After all, if a credible
case can be made by the prosecution that defense counsel could
have presented or preserved a fact or claim at the trial level and
did not, that fact or claim is waived.2 If a fact or claim could have
been raised on direct appeal, and was not, it is waived.3 If a fact or
claim could have been raised in state post-conviction or habeas and
was not, it is waived.' While none of this is new, since the rules on
waiver have been getting tougher as death penalty jurisprudence
has progressed, the new Act greatly increases the burden on de-
fense counsel.
Until the new Act, there was sometimes a way around the
problem of waiver.5 If an imprisoned inmate or one sentenced to
death could show that he had both cause for the failure to present
the fact and the federal claim to which it was tied and he could
show prejudice to him as a result, he could overcome the proce-
dural roadblock and at least get to present his issue to the federal
court.' This is no longer the case. Now the inmate must show not
only cause, but innocence as well.7
Even worse, under the new Act, if the defense attorney suc-
ceeds in bringing a claim into federal court, the application for a
writ of habeas corpus "shall not be granted"8 unless one of two
conditions is met. The first condition requires the state decision to
have been "contrary to ... clearly established Federal law, as de-
termined by the Supreme Court of the United States."9 Alterna-
tively, the second condition requires that the state decision in-
volved "an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal
law as established by the Supreme Court of the United States." 1o
The first Part of this Article briefly discusses the history of
the writ of habeas corpus and procedural default. The second part
examines the changes that the new Act imposes on the rules gov-
erning the writ of habeas corpus and procedural default. Lastly,
this Article focuses on the support that this Act can be seen as
providing for a generally expanded motions practice in preparing
for trial.
2. § 104, 110 Stat. at 1219.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977).
6. Id.
7. § 104, 110 Stat. at 1219.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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I.HIsToRY OF HABEAS CORPUS AND PROCEDURAL DEFAULT"
The writ of habeas corpus has a long and detailed history; it is
a history with its roots in the Roman Empire. 2 The "Great Writ"
came to the United States by way of English common law," and is
explicitly recognized in the United States Constitution.'4  Origi-
nally, the writ of habeas corpus was available only to federal pris-
oners. However, in 1867, by an act of Congress15 state court defen-
dants were afforded the same protections allowed under the writ.'6
This extension permitted federal courts to oversee state court pro-
ceedings for the first time, thus helping to secure the preservation
of constitutional rights for state court defendants.17 The states
have held much resentment as a result of this federal monitoring
function. State prosecutorial agencies in particular see this obser-
vatory function as an unwarranted intrusion into the affairs of the
state court system.'
During the 1960s, the Warren Court handed down a series
of decisions which extended the protections of the Bill of Rights to
11. See Marshall J. Hartman & Shelvin Singer, Requiem For Habeas Cor-
pus, THE CHAMPION, Mar. 1994, at 12-20 (discussing the history and scope of
the writ of habeas corpus). See also Andrea D. Lyon, Unintended Conse-
quences: The United States Supreme Court's Mission to Restrict Remedies for
State Prisoners Backfires, 30 CAL. W. L. REV. 265 (1994) for this author's
previous article on the subject of habeas corpus.
12. Albert S. Glass, Historical Aspects of Habeas Corpus, 9 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 55, 55-56 (1934). See also WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 187-211 (1980) (discussing the progression and
evolution which the writ of habeas corpus underwent before becoming avail-
able to both federal and state prisoners); Martin A. Schwartz, The Preiser
Puzzle: Continued Frustrating Conflict Between the Civil Rights and Habeas
Corpus Remedies for State Prisoners, 37 DE PAUL L. REV. 85, 91-98 (1988)
(describing the extension of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction over state pris-
oners); Maureen A. Dowd, A Comparison of Section 1983 and Federal Habeas
Corpus in State Prisoners' Litigation, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1315, 1319-25
(1984) (explaining the development of habeas corpus applicable to state pris-
oners).
13. Blackstone called it "the most celebrated writ in the English Law." 3
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 170.
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. "The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Cor-
pus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the
public Safety may require it." Id.
15. 14 Stat. 385 (1867).
16. See DUKER, supra note 12, at 187-211 (discussing the availability of
federal habeas corpus to state court defendants).
17. See SHELVIN SINGER & MARSHALL J. HARTMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE HANDBOOK §§ 1.1-1.3 (1986) (discussing the congres-
sional intent behind incorporating the Bill of Rights as against the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment).
18. See Larry W. Yackle, Explaining Habeas Corpus, 60 N.Y.U.L. REV. 991,
1010 (1985) (indicating that "state courts may resent federal, trial level courts
accepting habeas petitions and thus undertaking to second guess judgments
that may have been affirmed by the states' highest courts").
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defendants in state court. 9 In the landmark year of 1963, the Su-
preme Court handed down three decisions dealing with federal
habeas corpus, namely Fay v. Noia,0 Townsend v. Sain, 1 and
19. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471 (1966) (requiring the
recitation of one's right to remain silent and to consult with an attorney while
being questioned in state custody); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342
(1963) (requiring the appointment of counsel to the defendant accused of a fel-
ony crime in state court); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655-56 (1961) (holding
that the Exclusionary Rule of the Fourth Amendment applied to state court
proceedings via the Fourteenth Amendment). Prior to these cases, the Su-
preme Court held that the protections guaranteed by the Bill of Rights ap-
plied only in federal court. Therefore, state court defendants did not receive
the constitutional protections which the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments
guarantee.
20. 372 U.S. 391 (1963), overruled in part by Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504
U.S. 1, 5 (1992). In Fay v. Noia, the defendant faced a conviction for felony
murder largely because of an admittedly coerced confession. Id. at 394. The
district court denied Noia habeas relief because he filed his appeal late. Id.
The court's denial had an independent state ground for the decision. As a re-
sult of this independent state ground, the court prohibited federal review un-
der 28 U.S.C. § 2254 which provided in part that "[an application for a writ of
habeas corpus for a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State
court shall not be granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted
the remedies available in the courts of the State .... .- Fay, 372 U.S. at 396
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit re-
versed the lower court's denial of relief, with one judge dissenting. In its
holding, the court found that exceptional circumstances excused the statutory
requirement. Id. at 397. On appeal, the Supreme Court, in an opinion by
Justice Brennan, affirmed the Second Circuit's reversal after a thorough dis-
cussion of the history of the "Great Writ." Id. at 399-426. The Supreme Court
held that a federal district court should not deny a petitioner of federal habeas
relief based on evidence of a procedural failure unless the petitioner
"deliberately bypassed" state procedures. Id. at 438. This was a good faith
test that required consideration of the claim unless at the state court proceed-
ing, the petitioner or his defense counsel deliberately failed to raise a claim
which they had factual or legal knowledge. Id. at 439-40.
21. 372 U.S. 293 (1963), overruled in part by Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504
U.S. 1, 5 (1992). In Townsend v. Sain, the Supreme Court applied the same
.good faith" test in deciding when an evidentiary hearing on a petition from a
state prisoner was mandatory. Id. at 312-18. See also Lyon, supra note 11, at
267-68. Thus, the Court allowed habeas petitioners entitlement to a complete
evidentiary hearing on their constitutional claims in federal court unless the
petitioners "deliberately bypassed" the procedure mandated by the state
courts. Id.
The Townsend Court expressed two concerns. The first concern focused on
whether there was a constitutionally fair review of the facts. Id. at 317. The
second concern focused on the deprivation a petitioner would have of this fair
review if there was evidence of minimal review which had occurred in state
court. Id. In the aggregate, this case "cut through the procedural thicket of
state and federal comity" thereby requiring federal courts to grant relief to
criminal defendants when the state court acted in an unconstitutional man-
ner. See also Hartman & Singer, supra note 11, at 13. This decision did not
limit when a federal district court could hold a hearing sua sponte, only when
the district judge must hold such a hearing. Townsend, 372 U.S. at 318.
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Sanders v. United States.' Each of these cases made it possible for a
state prisoner to obtain relief in federal courts even when the peti-
tioner had made procedural errors, such as not filing an appeal on
time as long as there was what amounted to a good reason for the
default.
However, in 1977, the Supreme Court, with Warren Burger as
Chief Justice, shifted its position and modified Fay v. Noia.2 In
Wainwright v. Sykes, the Court instituted the "cause and prejudice"
test for courts to adhere to when confronted with questions of state
procedural default.' Under the Sykes test, the petitioner would be
barred from habeas corpus relief unless he could show "cause" as to
why he had not properly raised the claim during the state proceed-
ing and could demonstrate the "prejudice" resulting to him from the
alleged constitutional violation."5 After Sykes, courts stopped focus-
ing on the merits of claims and moved into endless inquiries on what
amounted to cause, what constituted prejudice, and what had been
procedurally defaulted. 6
22. 373 U.S. 1 (1963). In Sanders, the Supreme Court announced that
whether or not a second or successive petition constituted an abuse of the writ
of habeas corpus, which would compel dismissal, would depend on whether
the petitioner "deliberately abandon[ed]" the claim. Id. at 17-18. The Sanders
Court applied this test to cases where the defense counsel lacked either fac-
tual or legal knowledge of a specific constitutional claim apparent when the
petitioner filed the initial petition for habeas corpus relief. Id. at 16-18. As a
result, a successor petition for writ of habeas corpus could be successful un-
less defense counsel not only had such knowledge, but deliberately failed to
raise the claim. Id.
23. Fay, 372 U.S. at 438 (holding that "the federal habeas judge may in his
discretion deny relief to an applicant who has deliberately bypassed the or-
derly procedure of the state courts and ... has forfeited his state court reme-
dies").
24. 433 U.S. 72, 90-91 (1977).
25. See id. at 86-87 (stating that the Court's holding would "leave open for
resolution in future decisions the precise definition of the 'cause'-and-
'prejudice' standard") . See also Hartman & Singer, supra note 11, at 13
(stating that the Court viewed the Sykes standard as an attempt to promote
"procedural uniformity").
26. These inquiries, largely the result of prosecution urged procedural de-
fenses to litigation on the merits of a claim, became the subject of the public
perception of "endless appeals." While there may have been reason to "fault"
the defense for continuing to ask for relief, the fact that a large part of the
delay was occasioned by the prosecution is one that simply has never been
made in the media, resulting in a serious misperception of the need for
"reform." See generally, Michael O'Neill, On Reforming the Federal Writ of
Habeas Corpus, 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 1493 (1996) (detailing the new habeas
bill and the criticisms which the writ draws); James J. Sticha, Note, To Be Or
Not To Be? The Actual Innocence Exception in Noncapital Sentencing Cases,
80 MINN. L. REV. 1615 (1996) (noting the increased costs of litigation and the
effects on the actual innocence exception).
1997]
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II. How AEDPA IMPACTS TRIAL PRACTICE FOR DEFENSE
ATTORNEYS
It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss the impact of the
AEDPA on habeas practice in either the capital or non-capital con-
text." Instead, this Article seeks to articulate the duties the AEDPA
places on the trial lawyer. This Article further seeks to articulate
what opportunities these duties create for extensive, exciting and
exacting motions practice.
One could certainly argue that, before the AEDPA, a conscien-
tious defense attorney should file and litigate motions where, at a
minimum, she had more than a suspicion or a hunch that such a
motion was necessary. For instance, she would not file a motion to
dismiss the charges based on allegations of prosecutorial misconduct
unless she had evidence of that misconduct, and it was sufficiently
egregious to warrant such a motion. Indeed, even if the misconduct
was egregious enough, an attorney might decide not to file it for rea-
sons of trial strategy or because she thought the motion unlikely to
succeed. The defense counsel could do so, secure in the knowledge
that should more evidence come to light later on, evidence the attor-
ney could not have reasonably located through the exercise of due
diligence, such a challenge could be mounted in a federal habeas
corpus proceeding.28 In light of the new law, this simply is no longer
the case unless the prosecutorial misconduct is of such a nature that
not only could one show prejudice to the court, a difficult enough en-
deavor, but innocence of the crime itself. 29 In other words, if the de-
fense attorney has any reason to file such a motion she must do so.
The price of failing to do so is that the issue can never be brought to
the attention of the federal court unless it is accompanied by proof of
innocence."°
27. See Larry W. Yackle, A Primer on the New Habeas Corpus Statute, 44
BUFF. L. REV. 381 (1996) for an excellent discussion on the AEDPA with re-
spect to both capital and non-capital cases.
28. Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 11 (1992) (holding that the state
prisoner is "entitled to an evidentiary hearing in federal court if he can show
cause for a failure to develop facts in state court and actual prejudice result-
ing from that failure").
29. AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, 1219.
30. Id. Since the AEDPA seems to follow in large part some of the more
restrictive decision of the United States Supreme Court, it seems likely that
the shameful holding in Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993), created this
dichotomy. In Herrera, the Court held that it was not unconstitutional to exe-
cute an innocent man. Id. at 404. Schlup v. Delo, 115 S. Ct. 851 (1995), to
some degree overruled Herrera albeit sub silentio. In Schlup, the defendant
was a prison inmate who was convicted and sentenced to die for the murder of
another inmate. Id. at 856. The defendant produced a videotape that showed
him in the prison dining room some 65 seconds before the guards received a
[30:389
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III.TRIAL PREPARATION OPPORTUNITIES FOR DEFENSE
ATTORNEYS
So what does this mean for defense attorneys? More particu-
larly, what does it mean to defense trial attorneys? Well, it certainly
increases the burden on us. An attorney's failure to object, to file a
motion or to elicit a fact from a witness may indeed prove fatal to the
defendant's ability to even raise the issue in a federal court in sub-
sequent proceedings.
Yet, the author maintains that the AEDPA is actually an op-
portunity. Because the new Act places such a heavy burden on the
state courts, trial courts in particular, and because every fault ex-
cept the most egregious will be laid at defense counsel's door, the
much vaunted defense lawyer's paranoia actually serves her inter-
est.
In other words, if a defense attorney can think of a legitimate
good faith reason to file a motion, she should do so. In doing so, the
attorney should cite the bipartisan sponsored AEDPA. For example,
an attorney should consider whether to file a motion to recuse an
unfair judge. This is different than a motion to recuse a judge for
cause, and should require a lesser showing than an ordinary motion
or at least it ought to be. The reason is that if there is to be this
heightened deference to the trial judge's findings of fact as required
under the AEDPA,31 to the extent that those findings of fact cannot
be overturned except in the most extraordinary of circumstances,"
then defense counsel should make such a motion where there are
grounds to make it.
In addition, the defense attorney should make broader requests
for discovery in order to fully develop all of the pertinent facts for a
constitutional claim. Under the AEDPA, failure to do so may prove
fatal when raising the issue in federal court unless the defense at-
torney can meet the very stringent two prong test. The first prong
requires a factual predicate that could not have been found out with
the exercise of due diligence or, in the unlikely event that the United
States Supreme Court hands down a new rule of law which applies
retroactively to matters on collateral review. The second prong re-
quires the defense attorney to show factual innocence.33 Broader re-
quests for discovery means asking for the predicates for conclusions
that the police have drawn. For example, if an attorney has a police
report that says "the suspect matched the description," then you
distress call pertaining to the murder. Id. at 858. The petitioner's death sen-
tence and conviction were reversed and remanded in light of this evidence of
actual innocence. Id. at 869.
31. § 104, 110 Stat. at 1219 (setting forth the narrow circumstances in
which a defendant may obtain habeas corpus relief).
32. Id. (stating the "determination of a factual issue made by a State court
shall be presumed to be correct"). In addition, this provision allows a defen-
dant to overcome this presumption by clear and convincing evidence. Id.
33. Id.
1997]
The John Marshall Law Review
should ask in discovery how was it the police came to that conclu-
sion, and how the police located your client's photograph in the first
place. The constitutional reason for asking such a question is
grounded in the Fourth Amendment,34 and possibly in the Sixth
Amendment, 5 since there is a possibility that the police relied on an
informant whom the defendant may have a right to confront.5
While the new Act will not guarantee that the court will grant such
a discovery motion, in post-trial proceedings such a request may
very well satisfy the exhaustive requirements, since the defense at-
torney would have already made every effort to have a hearing on
the facts. All the motions discussed below will serve a similar pur-
pose under the AEDPA even if they are denied.
There are other sorts of constitutional motions that should be
made under the auspices of the same section of AEDPA. 7 Because
of the need to adequately develop facts in state court, the defense at-
torney can, and should, ask for an evidentiary hearing on a plethora
of issues relating to motions. If defense counsel has a good faith ba-
sis to suspect a Brady violation," such as prosecutorial misconduct,3 9
then the defense counsel should file a motion to discover the extent
of these violations, including a request for appropriate sanctions.
For example, if defense counsel has interviewed a witness, and that
witness has stated something exculpatory which he asserts he has
previously told the police or the prosecution, then the defense coun-
sel has a reason to file a motion alleging the Brady violation. In
raising this motion, defense counsel should ask for an evidentiary
hearing on what precisely occurred during the witness interview and
ask for disclosure of all contacts between the prosecutorial agency
involved and any other witness in the case.
Similarly, if there is physical evidence which has been, or is
going to be, sent to a crime laboratory for testing, then defense coun-
sel should move the court to order the evidence split in half so inde-
34. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
35. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
36. See, e.g., Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-61 (1957) (stating
that the identity of an informant may be disclosed at trial when the identity
or informant's communications are "relevant and helpful to the defense of an
accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a cause"). But see McCray v.
Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 312-13 (1967) (declining to recognize an absolute rule
that would allow an accused the right to confront an informant at a prelimi-
nary hearing).
37. See generally § 104, 110 Stat. at 1219.
38. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that prosecuto-
rial suppression of evidence favorable to the accused is a violation of due proc-
ess "where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment").
39. Prosecutorial misconduct includes situations where someone from the
police or other law enforcement agency unduly influences witnesses or where
there has been interference with the defendant's access to evidence via sub-
poena or other court order, such as an order directing the prosecution to
"make available" the physical evidence.
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pendent testing can be done. Furthermore, the defense counsel
should ask for an evidentiary hearing to determine the methods by
which the police or investigator collected and preserved the physical
evidence in order to determine if there has been any contamination
of the evidence. Defense counsel must ask the court for an eviden-
tiary hearing on each claim, and request that the trial judge give it
in order to fully develop the facts as the AEDPA now requires de-
fense counsel to do.
Because section 2254(d) of the AEDPA heightens the burden on
the defense to prevail in federal court, saying that a writ "shall not
issue" unless the state decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable
application of federal law as interpreted by the United States Su-
preme Court, or an unreasonable determination of the facts by the
trial judge, the defense counsel must ask either orally or in writing,
for the court's reasoning in ruling on motions and objections. One
must remember that the federal courts have been told to defer to the
trial court, and it is not fair to require the defendant to live with
those determinations when those determinations become virtually
unreviewable without the reasons for rulings on the record. Each
defense counsel should make this request for a written or oral ruling
at the beginning of the litigation, and renew and refer to that re-
quest as the litigation proceeds.
In the event that the defense loses its case, section 2244(d)(1) of
the AEDPA imposes a one year federal filing deadline from
"finality.""° In addition, most states have very short filing deadlines
of their own for filing any state post-conviction or habeas.4 For
these two reasons, the defense counsel should ask for a new lawyer
to be appointed to look at what was done and not done. In addition,
since this litigation is by its nature so fact intensive, defense counsel
should also ask that a new investigator and possibly a new expert or
experts be appointed so that new counsel can adequately develop the
facts as required. It is important to keep in mind that ineffective
assistance of counsel at the collateral stage is not a grounds for relief
under AEDPA; 2 therefore, a defense attorney cannot rely on some-
one being able to correct prior mistakes during the collateral stage.48
40. § 101, 110 Stat. at 1219.
41. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-4234 (Supp. 1995) (providing a 120-day
filing deadline for capital cases); IDAHO CODE § 19-2719 (providing a 42-day
filing deadline for capital cases); 725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West 1994) (providing a
45-day filing deadline for capital cases); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 34.575
(Michie 1996) (providing a 30-day deadline for capital cases); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15A-1415 (Supp. 1996) (providing a 120-day filing deadline for capital cases);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1089 (Supp. 1997) (providing a 90-day filing dead-
line for capital cases).
42. § 104, 110 Stat. at 1219-20.
43. While section 2244(d)(1)(B) of the AEDPA says that an exception to the
filing deadline will be made when "impediment to filing created by State ac-
tion" exists, it is not at all clear what exactly such an impediment might be.
1997]
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CONCLUSION
All of this may sound overwhelming to defense counsel, but re-
member, the burden falls not only on the defense, it falls equally on
the prosecution which, in most circumstances, must oppose such
motions. Furthermore, the burden falls upon judges who are acutely
aware of the burdens placed on already crowded dockets of this
requisite "extra" litigation. Most importantly, the burden falls on
the public who will see added costs both in time and money in trial
litigation. While the intent of Congress was certainly to "move
things along," the actual effect of this legislation may very well be
the opposite in that it should further complicate the pre-trial and
trial stages of these cases by giving the defense attorney the oppor-
tunity to truly investigate her case at a level she has been unable to
do before. This opportunity creates a more complex trial, an even
more complex record, and an expansion rather than a diminution in
the scope of litigation.
